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Abstract
Standard economic theory suggests that more choice is usually better. We address this claim
and investigate whether people can cope with the increasing number of television programs and
watch the amount of TV they find optimal for themselves or whether they are prone to over-
consumption. We find that heavy TV viewers do not benefit but instead report lower life sat-
isfaction with access to more TV channels. This finding suggests that an identifiable group of
individuals experiences a self-control problem when it comes to TV viewing.
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1. Introduction 
TV viewing is one of the most prevalent leisure time activities in modern 
societies. In many countries, the diffusion of cable or satellite televisions has led 
to a large increase in the number of TV channels and programs available to 
consumers. The evaluation of this development is unambiguous within a 
traditional economic framework. More choice raises individual welfare as - by 
assumption - people are able to rationally maximize utility. In this paper, we 
challenge this view and hypothesize that people with severe self-control problems 
suffer a utility loss when they are exposed to a larger set of choices. Specifically, 
the positive effect from a potentially better match between TV programs and 
individual preferences is more than offset by the loss of well-being resulting from 
over-consumption. 
The expansion and diversification of TV accessibility over the last few 
decades has, in many countries, gone hand in hand with increased TV viewing 
time (see the collected studies in Becker and Schoenbach 1989). Revealed 
preference therefore suggests that, for many people, TV consumption is a 
significant source of well-being. This assessment stands in contrast to the mixed 
appraisal of TV viewing in society. Television has been called a ‘plug-in-drug’, 
keeping people glued to the screen and impeding the enjoyment of more valuable 
activities. Accordingly, the increase in TV consumption over time has a negative 
connotation and is associated with a decline in social capital, an increase in 
violence and crime, and a weakening of democracy.1 In sum, there is a strong 
popular notion that people watch too much TV. People are prone to a weakness of 
will when faced with the temptation of TV’s immediate benefits and low 
immediate costs. They watch more than they would like to watch, both ex ante 
and ex post.  
This paper conducts an empirical study in analyzing the claim of 
systematic errors in TV consumption, based on individuals’ ex post evaluations. 
We study whether a larger number of available TV channels (i.e., a larger choice 
set) raises people’s subjective well-being, as standard economic theory would 
predict. We analyze people’s self-reported subjective well-being as a new 
empirical approach in order to discriminate between different theories predicting 
similar patterns of behavior, but which are associated with different levels of 
individual welfare (Frey and Stutzer 2005; Gruber and Mullainathan 2005). 
We test the hypothesis of limited self-control based on an interaction 
model and analyze how the number of TV channels affects the life satisfaction of 
people who watch an (unpredictably) large amount of television (referred to as 
heavy TV viewers) compared to individual who watch moderate levels of TV. For 
                                                
1 For reading on the negative impacts of TV consumption on society see, e.g., Kubey (1996), 
Putnam (2000), Sparks and Sparks (2002) and Gentzkow (2006). 
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the empirical analysis, we use recent data from the European Social Survey, 
World Values Survey and Television Key Facts from IP Network. Based on more 
than 125,000 individual observations from 76 country samples, we find a 
statistically significant negative interaction term between the (residual) amount of 
TV viewing and the number of TV channels, and calculate a negative marginal 
effect for the availability of additional TV channels on the well-being of people 
who watch a lot of TV or watch more TV than others with similar demographics. 
This finding is consistent with the hypothesis of limited self-control.  
We discuss and empirically address three alternative explanations for the 
observed statistical findings. First, we take into account the fact that the measure 
for the number of TV channels might not be representative for heavy TV viewers 
and the fact that the degree representativeness might vary systematically across 
countries. Second, the average negative marginal effect might also reflect some 
negative net effect from increased market competition that benefits some people 
while penalizing others, irrespective of heavy TV viewers suffering a self-control 
problem. In particular, competition between channels might benefit consumers 
who are valued by advertisers; i.e., young adult viewers and female viewers. 
Third, the results could be due to a selection effect in the sense that dissatisfied 
people turn to TV viewing in order to remedy their unhappiness. The more 
available TV channels there are, the more alluring TV viewing will be to such 
individuals as an attractive alternative (to drinking, for example).  
In our extended analysis, we do not find evidence for the first two 
alternative hypotheses. First, the negative marginal effect of additional TV 
channels is robust in a sample adjusted to the differences in diffusion of 
terrestrial, cable and satellite TV across countries and over time. Second, heavy 
TV viewers among young adults and women do not experience an increase in the 
level of well-being, but there is a decrease similar to that found in the full sample. 
The third alternative explanation cannot be ruled out in our ex post facto design. 
Instead, we propose a refined interaction analysis and study the effect of 
additional TV channels separately for people assumed to have more and for those 
assumed to have fewer resources for self-regulation.  
This study has links with three strands of economic literature. First, it 
contributes to the recent research on media consumption and its consequences 
(see, e.g., Prat and Strömberg 2005; Bruni and Stanca 2006; Gentzkow 2006; 
Bruni and Stanca 2008; Gentzkow and Shapiro 2008; Benesch 2009). Second, it 
adds to the evolving literature on individual welfare, based on data on subjective 
well-being (for surveys, see Frey and Stutzer 2002; Layard 2005; Stutzer and Frey 
2010). Third, it offers a complementary approach to studying time inconsistency 
in consumption choice (for a survey, see Frederick et al. 2002).  
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utility. The testing strategy is derived from simple graphical analysis. Section 3 
presents the data and the results of the empirical application. Section 4 offers 
concluding remarks. 
2. Experienced Utility in a Model of Time-Inconsistent Preferences 
Standard economics assumes that people have no self-control problems, and that 
they are able to make decisions based on their long-term preferences. The 
consumption of goods and the pursuit of activities that are generally considered to 
be forms of addiction, or at best bad habits, such as smoking cigarettes, watching 
large amounts of TV, or constantly eating fast food, are regarded as rational acts 
under the assumptions of economics. Contrary to this view, many people judge 
their own and other people’s consumption behavior as irrational, in the sense that 
they believe they would be better off if they consumed less of these goods. Goods 
offering immediate benefits at negligible immediate marginal costs are generally 
tempting. The psychological literature offers a large body of evidence on limited 
self-control (for an overview, see, e.g., Baumeister and Heatherton 1996).  
Based on the theory of revealed preference, it is difficult to discriminate 
between the view of consumers as being rational agents and consumers facing 
self-control problems.2 If temptation interferes with people’s decision making, 
there might well be a discrepancy between what individuals do and what they 
like. Using the terminology introduced by Kahneman et al. (1997), there might be 
a gap between decision utility and experienced utility. The distinction between 
decision utility and experienced utility leads to the idea that ex post evaluations 
can be a valuable source of information on bounded rationality in people’s 
decision-making. How do people fare after they have made decisions?3  
                                                
2 We are aware that there are specific situations in which the standard economic model rules out 
certain types of behavior and the mere observation of a certain action leads to a rejection of the 
standard economic model. There are some studies that successfully pursue this approach. Two 
important examples, which document the kind of behavior where the standard model does not 
apply, are DellaVigna and Malmendier (2006), who examine gym attendance under different 
contracts, and Skiba and Tobacman (2008), who show that certain types of payday loans would 
always be rejected by time-consistent individuals. 
3 Our analysis of ex post evaluations of consumption decisions can be linked to the concept of 
‘regret’ as the term is generally understood in everyday usage. Regret is a self-reflective emotional 
dissatisfaction with how a person has acted in the past. Emotions such as sadness, shame, 
embarrassment, depression or guilt reduce the level of utility experience after pursuing some 
consumption activities (as the individual subsequently regrets having pursued them). This 
interpretation is different from the concept of ‘regret’ in economic decision theory (see, e.g., 
Loomes and Sugden 1982), where the behavior of rational people (without any appraisal conflicts 
in implementing their preferred consumption plan) is predicted. 
Section 2 outlines the idea of systematic errors in consumption due to 
time-inconsistent preferences in a framework of decision utility and experienced 
3
Benesch et al.: TV Channels, Self-Control and Happiness
Brought to you by | Universitaetsbibliothek Basel
Authenticated
Download Date | 11/22/17 8:25 AM
This poses the question of how to ascertain a (normative) standard, and 
whether seemingly irrational behavior should be judged welfare-reducing because 
it violates certain time-consistency criteria. While there is an extended debate on 
this issue (see, e.g., Bernheim and Rangel 2005), we use people’s personal 
evaluations to establish the standard. We operationalize this standard in terms of 
individuals’ judgments of their overall subjective well-being, rather than how they 
evaluate options when faced with a particular decision. 
We outline the basic idea in a graphical analysis of a simple two-period 
model and extend it to illustrate our empirical testing strategy. We draft the case 
in which an extended opportunity set, here the number of available TV channels, 
decreases the experienced utility of consumers with a severe self-control 
problem.4 
An individual decides on the consumption of x, here the amount of time 
devoted to TV viewing, based on the enjoyment of x (i.e., utility u(x) in period 1) 
and the future costs c(x) in period 2, discounted by a factor δ. This reflects that 
benefits are experienced instantaneously, with zero immediate costs. In order to 
watch TV, one simply has to push a button. In contrast to going to the cinema, the 
theater or any outdoor activity, there is no need to dress appropriately before 
leaving the house, and there is no need to buy a ticket or to reserve a seat in 
advance. Unlike many other leisure activities, TV viewing does not need to be 
coordinated with other people. As a consequence, compared to other leisure 
activities, watching TV has an exceedingly low or nonexistent entry barrier. The 
costs resulting from TV consumption are largely experienced in the future. The 
negative effects of not getting enough sleep, for example, only arise the next day, 
and the consequences of underinvestment in social contact, education or career 
interests take much longer to become manifest.5 Given these circumstances, 
where TV viewing offers instant benefits at negligible immediate marginal cost, 
time inconsistency may arise. At the outset, a consumer (i.e., in period 0) plans to 
spend x* minutes watching TV, equalizing marginal benefits and marginal future 
costs (i.e., u’(x)=δ*c’(x) represents the first-order condition). However, when 
faced with making an actual decision on TV consumption, given the temptation of 
immediate gratification, future costs are only partially considered (here by a factor 
β∈(0,1)), and the consumption plan is revised so as to equalize u’(x)=β*δ*c’(x). 
                                                
4 Our analysis is related to the one by O’Donoghue and Rabin (2001), who show in a theoretical 
model that more choice among tasks with immediate costs and future benefits can lead to severe 
procrastination, and that a person might procrastinate more when pursuing important goals rather 
than unimportant ones. Our analysis is much simpler and emphasizes the case in which a more 
attractive alternative with immediate benefits and future costs might lead to amplified myopic 
behavior. 
5 The effect that television has in inflating people’s material aspirations by over-promoting wealth, 
fame and beauty cannot necessarily be predicted at all. 
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This formulation follows models of (quasi-)hyperbolic discounting (see, e.g., 
Laibson 1997). People who lack the self-control to maintain their original plans 
end up consuming xc (i.e., more than they consider optimal for themselves in the 
long-run) and experience an individual welfare loss. 
Figure 1 illustrates this situation for a specific set of preferences. It 
shows x*, the planned consumption level, and xc, the actual consumption level 
chosen due to the self-control problem (i.e., 0≤β<1). The triangle ABC indicates 
the individual welfare loss due to over-consumption. Total experienced utility 
over the two periods is lower than it would be if x* were consumed. 
Figure 1: The Loss of Experienced Utility with Time Inconsistent Preferences 
x* xc
A
B                          
C                          
β δ * c’(x)
δ * c’(x)
u’(x), c’(x)
u’(x)
x
Based on people’s reported judgment of their overall satisfaction with 
life, it would, in principle, be possible to directly capture the welfare loss: For 
otherwise similar individuals, the subjective well-being of heavy TV viewers 
could be compared with the subjective well-being of moderate viewers, and the 
difference attributed to systematic errors in consumption due to a lack of 
willpower. However, this approach is not feasible empirically. An omitted 
variable bias could occur because unobserved individual differences, such as 
being an introvert, might well be related to lower subjective well-being and higher 
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TV consumption, regardless of any self-control problem. Reverse causation is 
possible: Unhappy people might spend more time watching TV. Finally, 
preference heterogeneity with regard to TV viewing might be directly related to 
people’s reports of subjective well-being. 
We argue that these empirical challenges can be overcome in a refined 
approach studying the expansion of the opportunity set. In the case of television, 
this is the ongoing increase in the number of available TV channels. 
Figure 2 offers a graphical analysis that illustrates this idea. The 
expansion of the choice set is represented by an increase in the marginal utility of 
TV consumption from u1’(x) to u2’(x). An individual with time-consistent 
preferences increases TV consumption from x1* to x2*, and experienced utility is 
increased by the area ADG. For an individual with time-inconsistent preferences, 
there are two effects on experienced utility resulting from the shift in marginal 
utility. First, the shift increases experienced utility from the initial amount of TV 
viewing, because it is assumed that more channels mean more variety and better 
preference satisfaction. In other words, consumer surplus is increased, reflected 
by the area BHG.6 Second, the increased attractiveness of TV viewing leads to a 
revision of consumption plans. At this stage, an expansion of the opportunity set 
might reduce overall experienced utility. Because people with a self-control 
problem undervalue future costs when faced with a decision between turning their 
TVs on or off, they increase consumption more than would be optimal.7 Again, 
they realize a level of experienced utility that is below what they would 
experience if they were able to choose TV consumption optimally. The reduction 
in experienced utility due to a further increase in consumption amounts to the area 
CHEF. Whether more alternatives make people with a self-control problem worse 
off overall depends on the relative size of the two effects on people’s experienced 
utility. If the two effects are studied theoretically, they depend, of course, on the 
assumed functional form for the marginal utility and marginal cost of TV viewing. 
With linear functions, the net effect is more likely to be negative the larger the 
factor β is, and the less marginal utility u’(x) is decreasing (i.e., the closer u’’(x) is 
                                                
6 Area BHG consists of two parts: ADG is the increase in actual consumer surplus, and ABHD is 
part of the former welfare loss that is now offset. 
7 A study on the introduction of cable TV in Israel (comparing neighborhoods with a difference-in-
difference approach) supports this view (Weimann 1996). With cable TV, there is a significant 
increase in the percentage of viewers agreeing to the statements “I often watch more television 
than I intend to” (28% before the introduction of cable and 41% one year later) and “watching 
television is often a waste of time” (24% before the introduction of cable and 36% one year later). 
Asking people directly whether they think that they watch too much TV could, of course, lead to 
answers that are motivated by social desirability. It should be noted that surveys on general life 
satisfaction (as used in our study) are plausibly not affected by such a bias that is systematically 
correlated with some specific consumption behavior. 
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to zero). In Figure 2, for the particular combination of marginal utility, marginal 
costs and β, CHEF is larger than BHG. 
Figure 2: Gains and Losses in Experienced Utility Due to a More Attractive 
Technology 
x1* x2* x2cx1c
A
B                          
C                          
D                          
E                         
F                          
β δ * c’(x)
δ * c’(x)
u1’(x)
u2’(x)
u’(x), c’(x)
x
G                         
H                          
In the next section, our empirical analysis uses the possibility of a 
negative net effect as a testing strategy to identify self-control problems in TV 
consumption. It is hypothesized that the experienced utility of people with a 
severe self-control problem in TV viewing is reduced when they have access to a 
larger number of TV channels. We are aware that this is a conservative test and 
that the threshold is set high to reject the rationality hypothesis. Even if nobody 
loses from an increased opportunity set, there might still be over-consumption. 
However, the over-consumption cannot be detected, either by revealed behavior 
or by studying reported subjective well-being. 
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3. Empirical Analysis 
3.1 Empirical Testing Strategy 
Our basic hypothesis proposes that a larger number of TV channels, while 
possibly beneficial for rational consumers, reduces the welfare of consumers with 
self-control problems. In our test, we use reported life satisfaction as an 
approximation to individual welfare. We propose the consumption of large 
amounts of TV as an indicator for people who cannot completely control their TV 
consumption and refer to these individuals as ‘heavy TV viewers’. Accordingly, 
the interaction term between the number of available TV channels and the 
indicator of self-control is our main variable for the hypothesis test. 
The alternative hypothesis states that heavy viewers simply have an 
increased preference for TV consumption or that they have no higher-return 
activity available to them. In both of the latter cases, the standard model assumes 
that these people optimally allocate their time and additional TV channels raise 
their utility level, as this increases the probability that a program will match their 
preferences. At best, the additional channels should not reduce their utility level, 
because they could simply ignore these channels. 
In order to test the basic hypothesis, we specify two types of 
microeconometric life satisfaction functions. In the first type, the life satisfaction 
LSi of individual i depends on his or her television consumption TVi, (as an 
indicator of a possible self-control problem regarding TV consumption); on the 
interaction between this indicator and the number of TV channels Nj available in 
country j in a given year;8 on personal characteristics Xi; as well as on country 
specific effects Dj: 
LSi = β0 + β1 TVi + β2 (TVi * log(Nj)) + γ1 Xi + γ2 Dj + εi (1) 
In order to calculate the marginal effect according to the level of TV 
viewing, we specify a second extended life satisfaction function. In addition to the 
variables in Equation (1), the regression includes the number of TV channels 
available in a country. As this information is at country level, we can no longer 
control for country-specific fixed effects. Instead, we add the control variables 
Gross National Income (adjusted for comparative price levels) in its logarithmic 
                                                
8 In our setting a country-level variable for the number of TV channels is preferable to a variable 
that captures them at an individual level. The latter variable would reflect individuals’ choices 
(and thus the number of channels would be driven partly by individuals’ preferences). In contrast, 
we are interested in an overall restriction of the degree to which TV viewers are tempted. 
form log(GNIj), as well as average TV viewing time AvgTVj in a country.9 This 
leaves us with the following second specification: 
9 Data for Gross National Income are from World Development Indicators (several years), and 
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LSi = β0 + β1 TVi + β2 log(Nj) + β3 (TVi * log(Nj)) + γ1 Xi  
 + γ2 log(GNIj) + γ3 AvgTVj + εi (2) 
Substantial TV consumption (as an indicator of a potential self-control 
problem) enters the analysis in two ways. First, we include the level of TV 
consumption,10 whereby consumers who “ceteris paribus” spend a lot of time 
watching TV are identified by simultaneously including personal characteristics Xi
in the estimation equation. Second, we calculate a residual measure of TV 
consumption at the country level, because the simple amount of TV consumption 
might be a noisy measure of a possible self-control problem. There are many 
reasons why some people watch more TV than others independent of self-control. 
For example, people with a large amount of free time, such as retired and 
unemployed persons, or people with lower education and income, spend more 
time than average on TV consumption. We therefore propose the residuals of 
first-step regressions that explain individual TV consumption by respondents’ 
socio-demographic characteristics for each country sample separately as a refined 
measure for heavy TV consumption.11 In order to make the residuals comparable 
across countries, they are converted into deciles for each country. Hence, we 
expect people in the upper deciles, who watch more TV compared to similar 
people, to suffer from a self-control problem. There is, however, a trade-off with 
the first approach in the sense that factors that are potentially correlated with 
limited resources of self-control are partialled out. Accordingly, we check the 
robustness of our results using country deciles of residual TV viewing, calculated 
from a regression that only includes sex and age as explanatory variables. 
Our empirical testing strategy differs substantially from previous 
research in behavioral economics. This research generally studies whether the 
explanatory power of an (empirical) model is augmented when the variation in 
people’s levels of self-control are taken into account. Empirically, limited self-
control is captured, for example, by using behavioral markers, such as ‘not 
possessing a bank account’ or ‘having had numerous hangovers from alcohol 
                                                 
data for average TV viewing time are from IP Network (several years). 
10 Individual TV consumption is mean-adjusted at the country level. 
11 The explanatory variables are household income, age, sex, nationality (i.e., whether born in the 
country of residence or not), employment status, education, marital status, type or size of place of 
living and, additionally for the ESS, household size and working hours. For a description of the 
data, see section 3.2. Between 3% and 32% of the variation in TV viewing time is explained by 
these individual characteristics. Residual TV viewing time ranges from -3.41 to 3.21 hours. 
consumption in the recent past’ (see, e.g., DellaVigna and Paserman 2005), by 
letting people in experiments choose between immediate payoffs and higher 
delayed payoffs (Thaler 1981), or by self-reported indicators (e.g., Tangney et al. 
9
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2004). However, psychological theories emphasize the idea that self-control is not 
a personality trait but a resource (i.e., there is a limited capacity for self-
regulation). Resisting one temptation may result in poorer regulation of a 
concurrent desire for immediate gratification, or vice versa (Muraven et al. 1998). 
Accordingly, markers of self-control problems in one domain (e.g., smoking or 
drinking) need not concur with over-consumption in a different domain. Hence, 
self-control problems need to be studied for specific domains. Moreover, the 
mentioned approaches do not directly analyze the welfare consequences of 
supposedly shortsighted behavior, but rather assume or derive them from some 
imposed objective utility function. Often, the preferred consumption plan of the 
‘planning self’ is taken as a reference standard. We therefore depart from the 
previous literature in economics and, first, directly estimate welfare consequences 
and, second, study self-control problems within a single domain. 
3.2 Data 
The empirical analysis is based on data from the first two waves of the European 
Social Survey (ESS) and the third and forth waves of the World Value Survey 
(WVS), and supplemented by data on the number of TV channels at a country 
level collected by IP Network.12 Data from the ESS is for 21 European countries 
for 2002 to 200313 and for 25 European countries from 2004 to 2006.14 With the 
WVS, data on the number of TV channels is available for 28 countries from 1995 
to 199715 and for 2 countries for 2000 to 2001.16 Countries common to more than 
one survey or wave are treated as separate entities, as they are observed in 
different years. We, thus, have no time dimension in our analysis, but apply a 
cross-section framework. In each country, between approximately 600 and 3,000 
                                                
12 For the ESS data, see Jowell et al. (2003; 2005). The data are archived by the Norwegian Social 
Science Data Services (NSD). For the WVS data, see European Values Study Group and World 
Values Survey Association (2006); for the IP Network data, see IP Network (several years). 
13 The countries included are Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland, 
Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.  
14 The countries are Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, 
Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the Ukraine, and the UK. 
15 The countries included are Belarus, Brazil, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Finland, Germany, Hungary, India, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Mexico, Norway, 
Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the 
Ukraine, USA and Venezuela. 
16 The two countries are South Africa and Spain. 
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individuals were interviewed, supplying us with a total sample of 127,949 
observations.17 
The three key variables in our analysis are TV consumption, reported 
satisfaction with life and the number of TV channels available in a country. 
The ESS captures television consumption with the question, “On an 
average weekday, how much time do you spend watching television?”, with 
answers falling into eight categories, ranging from “no time at all” to “more than 
3 hours”. In the WVS, the question is “How much time do you usually spend 
watching television on an average weekday?”, with answers coded into four 
categories, ranging from “do not watch television or do not have access to TV” to 
“more than 3 hours”. For each category, we calculate the mid-point value of the 
time interval. For the top category, “more than 3 hours”, we chose 3.5 hours. 
Average TV viewing time in the sample is 2.0 hours (standard deviation 1.1). 
There is, however, substantial variation between countries. TV consumption is 
lowest in Mexico (with 1.1 hours) in wave 3 of the WVS and highest in 
Macedonia (with 2.7 hours) in wave 3 of the WVS. 
Individual life satisfaction is measured by the question, “All things 
considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole nowadays / these 
days?” Respondents give answers on an 11-point scale ranging from 0 
(“extremely dissatisfied”) to 10 (“extremely satisfied”) in the ESS, and on a 10-
point scale ranging from 1 (“dissatisfied”) to 10 (“satisfied”) in the WVS. To 
make the two scales comparable, we combine the lowest two categories in the 
ESS, 0 and 1, into one category. Average life satisfaction in the sample amounts 
to 6.7 (standard deviation 2.4), ranging from a low of 4.0 in the Ukraine in wave 3 
of the WVS to a high of 8.5 in Denmark in wave 2 of the ESS.  
In addition, both surveys include a large number of socio-demographic 
characteristics such as income, age, gender, whether born in the country of 
residence or not, employment status, education and marital status. We take them 
into account as control variables. The variables are not coded in exactly the same 
way in both surveys, but similarly enough to make them comparable.  
Statistical data on the number of television channels is available at the 
country level, published by IP Network in the form of the number of channels 
available to 70% of households. We take data that relates to the year the 
individuals were surveyed or the closest year available. The number of TV 
channels available to 70% of the population amounts, on average, to 10.3 
channels (standard deviation 12.6) and ranges from 1 in India and Romania to 62 
in the United States. The median is 4.5 channels (see Tables A1 and A3 in the 
Appendix). TV services are offered by terrestrial, cable and satellite providers. In 
                                                
17 Of the 131,189 people originally surveyed in the countries included in the analysis, 2,336 did 
not answer the question regarding the amount of their TV consumption and 993 did not answer the 
question about their life satisfaction. 
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the robustness analysis, we take into account that, due to the differences in the 
diffusion of these technologies, the measure for the number of channels might not 
be representative for the groups crucial to our empirical test. 
3.3 Results 
In our empirical analysis, we estimate an interaction model and test how the 
number of TV channels affects the life satisfaction of heavy TV viewers 
compared to light TV viewers. For ease of interpretation we apply an OLS 
estimator.18 Because some models include estimated independent variables and 
variables observed at the country level, we use heteroskedasticity-robust standard 
errors adjusted for clustering at the country level. 
Table 1 presents the basic results. Column (A) shows the direct effect of 
the logarithmic number of TV channels on life satisfaction; i.e., without the 
interaction term with TV consumption.19 There is no statistically significant effect 
of the number of TV channels on life satisfaction overall. Columns (B) to (D) 
include the three different indicators for heavy TV consumption,20 interaction 
terms with the log number of TV channels and country fixed effects according to 
specification (1) outlined above. In all three specifications, the interaction effect 
between TV viewing and the number of channels has a negative sign, is large and 
statistically significant at the 99%-level. Taking the different scaling of the 
indicators for TV consumption into account, the effects are of similar size in all 
three regressions (for effect sizes, see Figure 3 below). The higher a person’s 
(residual) TV consumption is, the smaller is the marginal effect of an additional 
channel on his or her life satisfaction. Yet, according to this specification, we 
cannot assess whether more TV channels actually have a negative effect on the 
life satisfaction of heavy TV viewers. The marginal effect of the number of TV 
channels on life satisfaction could merely be smaller for heavy TV viewers than 
for light TV viewers, but not negative. However, it can already be said that people 
who watch a lot of TV or watch much more TV than predicted, based on their 
individual characteristics, seem to benefit the least from additional TV channels. 
If unpredictably high TV consumption indeed reflects personal tastes, then this 
result might already come as a surprise. 
                                                
18 Given the ordinal nature of the dependent variable, we re-estimated our basic models applying 
ordered probit specifications. The relative size and statistical significance of coefficients are very 
similar to the results of the OLS estimations. The results based on ordered probit regressions are 
available from the authors on request. 
19 The regression is otherwise the same as for specification (2).  
20 The three indicators are hours of TV viewing, mean-adjusted in each separate country sample in 
column (B), deciles of residual TV viewing that are calculated from a regression only controlling 
for age and sex in column (C), and deciles of residual TV viewing that are calculated using all 
control variables in column (D). 
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Table 1: TV Consumption, Number of TV Channels and Life Satisfaction 
Dependent variable:
Life satisfaction (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) 
Indicator of TV viewing, mean 
adjusted 
 -0.027* 
(-2.15) 
-0.014**
(-3.29) 
-0.014**
(-4.42) 
-0.020 
(-1.48) 
-0.014**
(-2.98) 
-0.014**
(-4.33) 
log (number of TV channels), mean 
adjusted 
-0.047 
(-0.73) 
   -0.046 
(-0.72) 
-0.036 
(-0.57) 
-0.039 
(-0.61) 
Indicator of TV viewing * log (number 
of TV channels) 
 -0.051**
(-3.47) 
-0.020**
(-3.88) 
-0.016**
(-4.06) 
-0.051**
(-3.42) 
-0.021**
(-3.86) 
-0.016**
(-4.04) 
Individual control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Control variables at country level Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -1.824 
(-0.93) 
6.930**
(57.01) 
6.939**
(57.92) 
6.924** 
(56.44) 
-1.823 
(-0.93) 
-1.809 
(-0.93) 
-1.817 
(-0.93) 
Observations 127,949 127,949 127,949 127,949 127,949 127,949 127, 949 
R-squared 0.20 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.20 0.20 0.20 
Notes: (1) OLS estimates with standard errors adjusted for clustering at country level. t-values in parentheses. 
(2) ** significant at 99% level, * significant at 95% level, (*) significant at 90% level.  
(3) In regressions (B) and (E) the indicator of TV viewing is hours of TV viewing, mean adjusted in each country separately. In regression (C) 
and (F) the indicator is deciles of residual TV viewing calculated from a regression only controlling for age and sex (5th decile=0). In 
regressions (D) and (G) the indicator of TV viewing is deciles of residual TV viewing calculated using all control variables as described in 
Section 3.1 (5th decile=0). 
(4) Individual control variables include income, age, gender, whether born in the country of residence or not, employment status, education, 
and marital status, as well as dummy variables indicating missing observations. 
(5) Control variables at country level include log GNI per capita (PPP) and average TV viewing time. 
(6) For full specifications showing control variables see Table A2 in the Appendix. 
Data sources: European Social Survey (Wave 1 & 2), World Value Survey (Wave 3 & 4), IP Network (several years), World Development 
Indicators (several years). 
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Columns (E) to (G) in Table 1 show the results for specification (2). The 
estimations now include the log number of TV channels and additional control 
variables at the country level, but no country fixed effects. The estimated 
interaction effects between (residual) TV viewing and the number of TV channels 
are robust for all three indicators of TV consumption and have the same size and 
statistical significance as in the previous specifications. 
For a further interpretation of the coefficients, the mean adjustment of the 
number of TV channels and of residual TV viewing time must be taken into 
account. The coefficient of the constitutive term number of TV channels is 
estimated for respondents with an average level of TV consumption in their 
country or with an average residual (those in the 5th decile). It captures the 
marginal effect on life satisfaction if average TV viewers have more channels to 
choose from. The estimated coefficients are negative (-0.04 to -0.05), but are not 
statistically significant. From the latter coefficients and the interaction effects, the 
marginal effects of the number of TV channels on life satisfaction can now be 
calculated for all the different levels of (residual) TV viewing. The calculations 
are presented in Figure 3 together with the 90% and 95%-confidence intervals.21
In the following, we emphasize the results of our preferred estimation (G) based 
on residual TV viewing calculated with a full set of controls shown in Figure 3d. 
The results based on the two other indicators of TV consumption are very similar 
though. 
21 For a discussion of the interpretation and presentation of interaction models see Brambor et al. 
(2006). 
For people in the first decile of residual TV viewing time (i.e., those 
watching much less than predicted) having a higher number of TV channels to 
choose from has no impact on their life satisfaction. The marginal effect is close 
to zero. For people with above average residual TV viewing time, the marginal 
effect becomes negative and approaches statistical significance. Respondents 
viewing much more TV than predicted (10th decile) report ceteris paribus a 0.12 
lower life satisfaction (t-value=1.67) when, for example, living in a country with 
10 TV channels compared to living in a country with only 3 TV channels. This 
effect is sizeable; it corresponds, for example, to one fifth of the difference in life 
satisfaction between married and divorced people (-0.63).  
We also estimate a more flexible specification (not shown in Table 1), 
allowing the marginal effect of additional TV channels to vary freely for each 
decile of residual TV consumption. This specification gives up the restriction that 
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Figure 3: Number of TV Channels and Life Satisfaction
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there is a linear relationship between residual TV viewing and the marginal effect 
of additional TV channels, as implied by the former specification. Figure 3e 
presents the results of the more flexible specification, which includes dummy 
variables for each decile of residual TV consumption. The calculated marginal 
effects of additional TV channels on life satisfaction show a similar pattern and 
magnitude as in the more rigid specification. The same holds when residual TV 
viewing is calculated only using age and sex as controls (see Figures 3b and c) or 
when including the mean adjusted level of TV consumption (see Figure 3a). 
Thus, heavy TV viewers not only seem to benefit less from additional 
TV channels, but also experience a reduced level of life satisfaction. This finding 
is not consistent with a universe of sovereign TV consumers benefiting from a 
larger choice set. Rather, the finding suggests heterogeneity in self-control and is 
consistent with the view that part of observed individual TV consumption is due 
to a lack of willpower when exposed to the temptation of satisfying immediate 
pleasure. Referring to our graphical analysis in Section 2, on average, about 10% 
of the respondents (taking the 90% significance level as a cutoff point) experience 
a net welfare loss from an increase in the number of TV channels (i.e. area CHEF 
is larger than BHG). Applying the same statistical cutoff point, there is no group 
of respondents that experiences statistically significantly higher individual welfare 
if the number of TV channels is increased. 
3.4 Robustness 
In our robustness analysis, we address three alternative explanations for the 
observed patterns in the correlation between TV viewing and life satisfaction in 
relation to the number of TV channels. Moreover, we study the sensitivity of the 
results with regard to sample selection. All the tests are based on the indicator of 
TV consumption based on residual TV viewing calculated from a regression with 
a full set of controls (which led to the most conservative estimates as reported in 
Figure 3). 
The first alternative questions the representativeness of the measure on 
the number of TV channels for the group of heavy TV viewers. A spurious 
negative correlation for the interaction term could emerge if the following 
scenario were to occur: In countries with few channels on average, only the rich 
and happy can afford satellite TV, have more channels than normal and therefore 
also watch more TV. In contrast, in countries where almost everyone has cable or 
satellite TV, people who watch a lot of TV tend to be unhappy, lonely or 
unemployed. Across countries, heavy TV viewers would seem less satisfied with 
more channels. A second alternative explanation suggests that TV markets with 
many channels rather than a few channels differ in other respects than just 
program variety. A concern about the documented relationship between TV 
channels and life satisfaction is therefore that it actually reflects some differences 
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between media markets rather than suboptimal decisions by some individuals. 
Third, the observed pattern could be the result of selection effects. Dissatisfied 
people more often watch TV to alleviate their miserable situation if more TV 
channels are available. 
a) Measures of the number of TV channels 
Our measure for the number of TV channels (i.e., the number of TV channels 
received by 70% of the population as published by IP Network) is arbitrary to 
some extent. All the same, it probably provides a good approximation of the 
average choice of TV programs in a country. Moreover, it is exogenous to 
individual choice, which fits the design of our empirical test. However, it does not 
take into account the variance of the number of TV channels within a country.  
This aspect disturbs our testing strategy if (i) the number of TV channels 
at the individual level is correlated with individual TV viewing time and life 
satisfaction within a country and (ii) this correlation is systematically different 
between countries with a low aggregate number of TV channels and countries 
with a high aggregate number. In the scenario mentioned above, the happy heavy 
viewers in the (poor) countries with few TV channels might then be compared 
with the unhappy heavy viewers in the (affluent) countries with many TV 
channels. It is important to note, though, that any such effect needs to go beyond 
the individual characteristics (like income) controlled for in the estimation 
equations, determining the heavy viewers separately for each country sample. 
In our first robustness check, we aim at compiling country samples of 
individuals for whom the information on the number of TV channels is 
representative. We do this by excluding observations at the tails of the distribution 
of residual TV viewing time, taking into account information on market 
penetration with terrestrial, cable and satellite TV. We apply the following 
procedure. Households with only terrestrial TV usually have access to only a few 
channels, while the offering is larger for households with cable or satellite TV. If 
70% or more of the households in a country only have terrestrial TV, the measure 
on the number of TV channels available is probably sufficiently accurate for these 
households. However, it is not accurate for the households with cable or satellite 
TV. In this case, we exclude the percentage of respondents with cable or satellite 
TV from the analysis (i.e., the respective percentage of respondents with the 
highest residual TV viewing time). Accordingly, if 70% or more have access to 
cable or satellite TV, we exclude the percentage with only terrestrial TV (i.e., the 
respective percentage of respondents with the lowest residual TV viewing time). 
The exclusion procedure is thus based on the assumption also underlying the 
alternative hypothesis that the individual number of TV channels and individual 
(residual) TV viewing time are positively correlated within a country.  
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Data on terrestrial cable and satellite diffusion are from IP Network and 
shown in Table A3 in the Appendix. The fraction of people who only have access 
to terrestrial TV in our data base is smallest in Luxembourg and the Netherlands 
(around 1%), and largest (in the early surveys) in Spain (92%), the Ukraine (93%) 
and Greece (99%). Table 2 presents the regression results after the samples have 
been adjusted. The number of country samples drops from 76 to 73 as the specific 
data is not available for 3 countries.22 The number of observations drops from 
127,949 to 88,424 due to the exclusion criteria described above. 
Table 2: TV Consumption, Number of TV Channels and Life Satisfaction: 
Country Samples adjusted for the Diffusion of Terrestrial, Cable and Satellite TV 
Dependent variable:
Life satisfaction 
(A) (B) 
Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
Deciles of residual TV viewing (5th
decile=0) 
-0.006  -1.44 -0.006  -1.35 
log (number of TV channels, mean 
adjusted) 
  -0.097  -1.52 
Deciles of residual TV viewing *  
log (number of TV channels) 
-0.023 ** -4.46 -0.024 ** -4.42 
Individual control variables Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes No 
Control variables at country level No Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Constant 6.869 ** 53.69 -2.322  -1.21 
Observations 88,421 88,421 
R2 0.26 0.22 
Notes: (1) OLS estimates with standard errors adjusted for clustering at country level. 
(2) ** significant at 99% level, * significant at 95% level, (*) significant at 90% level. 
(3) Individual control variables are the same as in Table A2 and include income, age, gender, 
whether born in the country of residence or not, employment status, education, and marital status, 
as well as dummy variables indicating missing observations. 
(4) Control variables at country level are the same as in Table A2 and include log GNI per capita 
(PPP) and average TV viewing time. 
Data sources: European Social Survey (Wave 1 & 2), World Value Survey (Wave 3 & 4), IP 
Network (several years), World Development Indicators (several years).
                                                
22 The 3 country samples excluded are Macedonia, the Czech Republic, and Mexico for WVS 3. 
The difference between the results in Table 1 and Table 2 is not mainly due to this difference in 
observations. 
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Otherwise, the estimates are based on the same specifications as those in 
Column (D) and (G) in Table 1. The results are robust to the adjustment of the 
samples. The estimated coefficient for the interaction term is even larger in 
absolute terms (-0.024) than in the baseline specification. Figure 4 shows the 
marginal effects of additional TV channels on life satisfaction. They are large, 
negative and statistically significant at the 95% level for intermediate and high 
levels of residual TV viewing time. Thus, the findings for the full country samples 
cannot easily be explained by differences in the diffusion of different TV 
technologies. 
Figure 4: Number of TV Channels and Life Satisfaction: Country Samples 
adjusted for the Diffusion of Terrestrial, Cable and Satellite TV 
a) Linear specification of residual TV  b) Specification based on categories of 
viewing residual TV viewing  
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b) Young adult viewers and female viewers 
The second robustness test looks at an alternative explanation of the partial 
correlations in terms of differences in media markets. In countries where people 
have access to more TV channels, TV markets tend to be less regulated and 
(annoying) commercial time might be higher. Some theoretical models of TV 
markets show a trade-off between diversity (i.e., number of channels) and the 
average quality of programs. In a population with heterogeneous preferences, 
some groups might therefore lose from an increased choice of programs (see, e.g., 
Liu et al. 2004; Anderson and Coate 2005; Liu et al. 2006). Furthermore, social 
costs might be associated with increased TV viewing due to the availability of 
more channels, even if the individual viewing choice were rational (see, e.g., 
Putnam 2000; Corneo 2005). Many of these possible market differences will 
affect heavy and light viewers alike and do not undermine our empirical test based 
on an interaction hypothesis. However, some differences might mainly impact 
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individuals with a high preference for TV viewing. To address this concern, we 
run our regressions for different subgroups of the population. 
It is well-documented that in highly competitive TV markets, with many 
channels available, programs are tailored to particular viewer groups which are of 
specific interest to advertisers (see, e.g., Hamilton 2004 for a comprehensive 
discussion). These are mainly young adult viewers and female viewers (being the 
“main purchasers” in a household). In contrast, in less competitive markets with 
fewer channels, and to a large extent government or license-fee financed channels, 
programs are targeted at broader viewing groups. The young adult viewers and 
female viewers should thus have the most to gain – or the least to lose – when 
more channels are available. If the negative relationship between the number of 
TV channels and life satisfaction for heavy viewers is due to omitted market 
characteristics, rather than a lack of individual self-control, the relationship should 
be less pronounced or non-existent for these groups. 
Table 3: TV Consumption, Number of TV Channels and Life Satisfaction of 
Young Adult Viewers and Female Viewers 
Dependent variable:
Life satisfaction 
Young adult viewers 
(18-34) Female viewers 
Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
Deciles of residual TV viewing (5th
decile=0) 
-0.014 ** -3.30 -0.012 ** -3.39 
log (number of TV channels, mean 
adjusted) 
-0.096 (*) -1.69 -0.043  -0.66 
Deciles of residual TV viewing *  
log (number of TV channels) 
-0.015 ** -3.57 -0.016 ** -3.89 
Individual control variables  Yes  Yes  
Control variables at country level  Yes   Yes  
Year fixed effects Yes   Yes  
Constant 0.506  0.29 -3.310 (*) -1.70 
Observations 40,733 67,760 
R2 0.15 0.21 
Notes: (1) OLS estimates with standard errors adjusted for clustering at country level. 
(2) ** significant at 99% level, * significant at 95% level, (*) significant at 90% level. 
(3) Individual control variables are the same as in Table A2 and include income, age, gender, 
whether born in the country of residence or not, employment status, education, and marital status, 
as well as dummy variables indicating missing observations. 
(4) Control variables at country level are the same as in Table A2 and include log GNI per capita 
(PPP) and average TV viewing time. 
Data sources: European Social Survey (Wave 1 & 2), World Value Survey (Wave 3 & 4), IP 
Network (several years), World Development Indicators (several years).
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Figure 5: Number of TV Channels and Life Satisfaction of Young Adult 
Viewers and Female Viewers 
a) Young adult viewers, linear  b) Young adult viewers, specification 
specification based on categories of residual TV  
 viewing 
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c) Female viewers, linear specification d) Female viewers, specification based  
on categories of residual TV viewing 
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Table 3 presents the regression results for the specified age and gender 
groups. In comparison to the estimates for the entire population in Table 1, the 
size and the statistical significance of the coefficients hardly change when looking 
only at young adult viewers aged from 18 to 34 (first regression in Table 3) or 
female viewers (second regression in Table 3). If anything, the marginal effect of 
the number of channels on life satisfaction for heavy viewers tends to increase and 
becomes statistically significant at higher levels (see Figure 5). This finding runs 
counter to the alternative explanation in terms of rational TV consumers, that 
differential effects of additional TV channels benefit some heavy TV viewers, 
while harming others. The groups most likely to benefit, young adult viewers and 
female viewers, who spend a lot of time watching TV, actually report lower life 
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satisfaction when they have access to more channels. The finding thus lends 
further support to the hypothesis that unpredictably heavy TV viewers face a 
problem of limited self-control when making their consumption decisions. 
c) General resources for self-regulation 
Our basic testing approach rests on the assumption that certain people will be 
heavy TV viewers regardless of the number of TV channels available. However, 
unhappy people might increasingly turn towards TV viewing if there are more TV 
channels available. This alternative explanation based on selection cannot easily 
be rejected empirically. We control for many observable characteristics that are 
correlated with low life-satisfaction levels. However, there may be unobserved 
characteristics that drive selection. 
As an alternative strategy, we propose a refined interaction analysis and 
look for additional predictions that cannot easily be aligned with a selection 
explanation. Specifically, we are looking for a variable that helps to identify 
people ex ante who are more or less at risk of falling victim to temptations that 
challenge the implementation of their preferred plans of action. This follows the 
idea that people have a limited capacity for self-regulation (see Subsection 3.1, 
above).  
Interestingly, involvement in religious activities has been found to 
positively correlate with measures of self-control and personality traits that 
subsume aspects of self-control. Religion can promote self-control insofar as it 
influences the selection, pursuit and management of goals and fosters self-
monitoring and self-regulatory strength (see, e.g., McCullough and Willoughby 
2009). This can be interpreted in terms of religious people possessing more 
willpower to stick to their planned allocation of time. Accordingly, it can be tested 
whether more religious people suffer less from self-control problems with regard 
to TV consumption and the temptations arising from an increased set of choices; 
i.e., the number of TV channels. 
In an exploratory analysis, we implement the refined test by estimating a 
life satisfaction equation including, in addition to the variables in the baseline 
model, a three-way interaction between residual TV viewing, the number of TV 
channels and religiosity (plus all the relevant constitutive terms). Religious 
activity is measured in terms of frequency of religious service attendance (on a 
six-point scale ranging from “never” to “more than once a week”). We are aware 
that the distinction between religious and non-religious people is vague and 
encompasses such things as the differences in denominations, country-specific 
aspects of religious organizations, and individual differences in social capital. 
However, this differentiation is still appropriate to illustrate that our test strategy 
can be refined in order to provide additional testable predictions. In an attempt to 
take account of some of the general differences between countries, we use the 
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deviation from the country median in our analysis.23 We find that the estimated 
three-way interaction effect between residual TV viewing, the number of TV 
channels, and religiosity is indeed positive and statistically significant (0.003, 
t=1.82) (see Table 4). This means that, for religious people, the marginal effect of 
the number of TV channels on life satisfaction is statistically not significant for 
any level of residual TV viewing. In contrast, for non-religious individuals the 
marginal effect is similar to the effect in the baseline specification (i.e., negative 
and statistically significant at conventional levels for high residual TV viewing 
(see Figure 6)). 
Table 4: TV Consumption, Number of TV Channels and Life Satisfaction of 
Religious and Non-Religious People 
Dependent variable:
Life satisfaction Coefficient t-value 
Deciles of residual TV viewing (5th decile=0) -0.011** (-3.73) 
log (number of TV channels, mean adjusted) -0.047 (-0.73) 
Religious activity (deviation from the country 
median) 
0.093** (7.76) 
Deciles of residual TV viewing * log (number of 
TV channels) 
-0.015** (-4.00) 
Deciles of residual TV viewing*religious activity -0.002 (-1.11) 
Religious activity* log (number of TV channels) 0.012 (1.19) 
Religious activity*deciles of residual TV viewing 
* log (number of TV channels) 
0.003(*) (1.82) 
Individual control variables Yes 
Control variables at country level Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes 
Constant -2.247 (-1.17) 
Observations 127,413 
R2 0.20 
Notes: (1) OLS estimates with standard errors adjusted for clustering at country level. 
(2) ** significant at 99% level, * significant at 95% level, (*) significant at 90% level. 
(3) Individual control variables are the same as in Table A2 and include income, age, gender, 
whether born in the country of residence or not, employment status, education, and marital status, 
as well as dummy variables indicating missing. 
(4) Control variables at country level are the same as Table A2 and include log GNI per capita 
(PPP) and average TV viewing time. 
Data sources: European Social Survey (Wave 1 & 2), World Value Survey (Wave 3 & 4), IP 
Network (several years), World Development Indicators (several years). 
                                                
23 This religiosity indicator ranges from -4 to 5. If we just include religious attendance without 
adjustment into the regression, the three-way interaction term is not statistically significant at 
conventional levels. 
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Figure 6: Number of TV Channels and Life Satisfaction by Level of Religious 
Activity 
d) Sample Selection 
In order to clarify whether the results are driven by some outliers, Figure 7 shows 
a scatter plot. For each country-wave, the partial correlation coefficient of residual 
TV viewing on life satisfaction (from a regression explaining life satisfaction with 
residual TV watching and controls) is plotted as a function of the corresponding 
number of TV channels. Each plotted dot is labeled with the abbreviated country 
name and the data source. 
Overall, there exists a negative relationship between the estimated 
coefficients and the number of TV channels (as was to be expected from the 
regression analysis). Potentially influential observations become visible; if 
excluded from the analysis they lead to a decreased or increased interaction effect. 
For instance, if the observations for India (WVS3) and Bulgaria (WVS3) are 
excluded from the regression analysis, the interaction effect becomes somewhat 
smaller. In the regression for the whole sample, the coefficient drops from -0.016 
(t=-4.04) to -0.012 (t=-3.99). However, it is still statistically significant at the 99% 
level. 
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Figure 7: Marginal Effect of Residual TV Viewing on Life Satisfaction and 
Number of TV Channels by Country and Survey 
4. Concluding Remarks 
Standard economic theory assumes that individuals are rational in the sense that 
they are able, first, to evaluate and decide on the optimal amount of consumption 
and, second, to implement their preferred consumption plan. In this framework, a 
larger set of choices is expected to increase (or at least not to decrease) individual 
welfare, as it enables people to better satisfy their preferences. Moreover, any 
change in observed consumption is considered an optimal adjustment to the larger 
choice set. 
We challenge this view for the specific case of TV viewing and the 
expansion of TV accessibility providing people with more and more channels. We 
argue that observed TV consumption should not be considered optimal a priori. 
Instead a theoretical framework should be chosen that allows for the possibility of 
over-consumption. We propose a framework that includes people’s limited 
willpower that is challenged by the immediate benefits of TV watching at 
negligible immediate marginal costs. We hypothesize and find evidence that some 
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heavy TV viewers have a self-control problem that leads to excessive TV viewing 
and lower well-being according to their own evaluations. 
We think that TV viewing is a particularly relevant issue for further 
research on optimal consumption choice because it is one of today’s most time-
consuming activities: in many countries, over the course of their lives, people 
spend, on average, as much time watching TV as they do working. Hardly anyone 
would deny that watching TV provides pleasure, at least some of the time, and 
that it is an important source of information. Yet, as our research suggests, some 
people are not able to optimally balance the benefits and the (future) costs 
associated with television consumption.  
Our analysis explores the rationality of the level of TV consumption 
rather than of marginal reactions in consumption due to changes in relative prices. 
Valuable insights could be gained from further research in this direction. In fact, 
the most immediate consequence of television consumption, the immense time 
consumption, has so far received little attention in research. The growing body of 
work on the economics of time use (see, e.g., the collected studies in Hamermesh 
and Pfann 2005) will hopefully shed further light on how individuals allocate the 
ultimate scarce resource, time. 
Appendix 
Table A1: Descriptive Statistics 
Mean Standard deviation Median MinimumMaximum 
Number of 
observations
TV viewing (hours) 1.98 1.06 1.75 0.00 3.50 127,949 
Residual TV viewing 
(hours) 
0.00 0.94 -0.02 -3.41 3.21 127,949 
Life satisfaction 6.71 2.39 7.00 1.00 10.00 127,949 
TV channels 10.33 12.55 4.50 1.00 62.00 76 
Data sources: European Social Survey (Wave 1 & 2), World Value Survey (Wave 3 & 4), IP 
Network (several years). 
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Table A2: TV Consumption, Number of TV Channels and Life Satisfaction, 
Full Specification 
Dependent variable:
Life satisfaction (A) (D) (G) 
Deciles of residual TV viewing (5th decile=0)  -0.014** 
(-4.42) 
-0.014** 
(-4.33) 
log (number of TV channels, mean adjusted) -0.047 
(-0.73) 
 -0.039 
(-0.61) 
Deciles of residual TV viewing * log 
(number of TV channels) 
 -0.016** 
(-4.06) 
-0.016** 
(-4.04) 
Income deciles 0.106**
(8.72) 
0.112** 
(13.05) 
0.105** 
(8.70) 
Age -0.087**
(-18.37) 
-0.081** 
(-17.38) 
-0.087** 
(-18.39) 
Age, squared 0.001**
(18.51) 
0.001** 
(17.56) 
0.001** 
(18.54) 
Male Reference group 
Female 0.032 
(1.04) 
0.085** 
(4.82) 
0.031 
(1.04) 
Not born in country of residence Reference group 
Born in country of residence 0.358**
(7.31) 
0.217** 
(6.17) 
0.358** 
(7.31) 
Paid work, employed Reference group 
Paid work, self-employed 0.258**
(4.27) 
0.084* 
(2.63) 
0.258** 
(4.27) 
Unemployed -0.852**
(-11.07) 
-0.894** 
(-15.02) 
-0.851** 
(-11.09) 
Retired -0.072* 
(-1.90) 
-0.027 
(-0.82) 
-0.072* 
(-1.89) 
In education 0.265**
(5.51) 
0.267** 
(6.22) 
0.265** 
(5.51) 
Housework, looking after children 0.245**
(3.38) 
0.051 
(1.47) 
0.246** 
(3.39) 
Doing other work -0.562**
(-7.62) 
-0.539** 
(-8.50) 
-0.562** 
(-7.61) 
No formal or incomplete primary education -0.336**
(-2.83) 
-0.457** 
(-5.04) 
-0.336** 
(-2.83) 
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Table A2, continued
Complete basic or primary education Reference group 
Upper or post secondary, non-tertiary educ. 0.076 
(1.29) 
0.161** 
(5.78) 
0.076 
(1.29) 
Tertiary education 0.290**
(4.88) 
0.295** 
(7.65) 
0.290** 
(4.87) 
Married Reference group 
Divorced -0.625**
(-12.94) 
-0.620** 
(-15.47) 
-0.625** 
(-12.94) 
Separated -0.844**
(-11.27) 
-0.882** 
(-14.69) 
-0.844** 
(-11.26) 
Widowed -0.625**
(-16.43) 
-0.580** 
(-16.11) 
-0.625** 
(-16.43) 
Not married, living with partner -0.246**
(-4.99) 
-0.312** 
(-7.84) 
-0.246** 
(-5.00) 
Not married, living without partner -0.483**
(-14.95) 
-0.528** 
(-19.19) 
-0.484** 
(-14.96) 
GNI per capita (PPP), log 1.221**
(6.70) 
 1.221** 
(6.70) 
Average TV viewing time in country (min.) -0.010**
(-5.06) 
 -0.010** 
(-5.06) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects No Yes No 
Constant -1.824 
(-0.93) 
6.924** 
(56.44) 
-1.817 
(-0.93) 
Observations 127,949 127,949 127,949 
R2 0.20 0.25 0.20 
Notes: (1) OLS estimates with standard errors adjusted for clustering at country level. t-values in 
parentheses. 
(2) ** significant at 99% level, * significant at 95% level, (*) significant at 90% level.   
(3) Dummy variables for the different countries and years are not shown. Dummy variables 
indicating missing observations for income, age, gender, country of birth, employment status, 
education, and marital status are also not shown.  
Data sources: European Social Survey (Wave 1 & 2), World Value Survey (Wave 3 & 4), IP 
Network (several years), World Development Indicators (several years).
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Table A3: Diffusion of Terrestrial, Cable, and Satellite TV 
Country Survey 
No. of TV channels 
for 70% of 
population 
Only terrestrial 
TV 
Cable or satellite 
TV 
Austria ESS 1 14 13% 87% 
Austria ESS 2 24 15% 85% 
Belgium ESS 1 32.5 3% 97% 
Belgium ESS 2 30 3% 97% 
Brazil WVS 3 3 89% 11% 
Bulgaria WVS 3 2 55% 45% 
Belarus WVS 3 3 83% 17% 
Croatia WVS 3 3 62% 38% 
Czech Republic ESS 1 4 71% 29% 
Czech Republic ESS 2 4 75% 25% 
Czech Republic WVS 3 4 
Denmark ESS 1 5.5 17% 83% 
Denmark ESS 2 4 19% 81% 
Estonia ESS 2 3 49% 52% 
Estonia WVS 3 4 80% 20% 
Finland ESS 1 4 44% 56% 
Finland ESS 2 4 28% 72% 
Finland WVS 3 4 56% 44% 
France ESS 1 7 67% 33% 
France ESS 2 7 61% 39% 
Germany ESS 1 25 7% 93% 
Germany ESS 2 30 3% 97% 
Germany WVS 3 36 12% 88% 
Greece ESS 1 10 99% 1% 
Greece ESS 2 9 99% 1% 
Hungary ESS 1 3 37% 63% 
Hungary ESS 2 3 34% 66% 
Hungary WVS 3 3 20% 80% 
Iceland ESS 2 4 87% 13% 
India WVS 3 1 77% 23% 
Ireland ESS 1 6 40% 60% 
Ireland ESS 2 6 35% 65% 
Italy ESS 1 9 83% 17% 
Japan WVS 3 7 78% 22% 
Latvia WVS 3 3 69% 31% 
Lithuania WVS 3 4 78% 22% 
Luxembourg ESS 1 40 2% 98% 
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  Table A3, continued
Luxembourg ESS 2 40 1% 100% 
Mexico WVS 3 4 
Netherlands ESS 1 29 1% 100% 
Netherlands ESS 2 26 1% 100% 
Norway ESS 1 4 31% 69% 
Norway ESS 2 4 28% 73% 
Norway WVS 3 4 44% 56% 
Poland ESS 1 5 42% 58% 
Poland ESS 2 6 47% 53% 
Poland WVS 3 3 51% 49% 
Portugal ESS 1 4 57% 43% 
Portugal ESS 2 4 50% 51% 
Romania WVS 3 1 46% 54% 
Russia WVS 3 7 83% 17% 
Slovakia ESS 2 4 52% 48% 
Slovakia WVS 3 3 20% 80% 
Slovenia ESS 1 3 35% 65% 
Slovenia ESS 2 5 33% 67% 
Slovenia WVS 3 5 51% 49% 
South Africa WVS 3 4 80% 20% 
South Africa WVS 4 4 78% 22% 
Spain ESS 1 5 78% 22% 
Spain ESS 2 5 72% 29% 
Spain WVS 3 5 92% 8% 
Spain WVS 4 5 61% 39% 
Sweden ESS 1 3 28% 72% 
Sweden ESS 2 3 24% 77% 
Sweden WVS 3 3 37% 63% 
Switzerland ESS 1 39 5% 95% 
Switzerland ESS 2 41 6% 95% 
Switzerland WVS 3 31 23% 77% 
Turkey ESS 2 15 68% 32% 
Ukraine ESS 2 10 58% 42% 
Ukraine WVS 3 3 93% 7% 
Macedonia WVS 3 7 
Great Britain ESS 1 5 53% 47% 
Great Britain ESS 2 5 36% 64% 
United States WVS 3 62 27% 73% 
Venezuela WVS 3 4 86% 14% 
Data Source: IP Network (several years). 
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